Related papers: On Transshipment Games with Identical Newsvendors
We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor…
Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
In this paper, the interaction of geopolitical actors in the production and sale of military equipment is studied. In section 2 the production of military equipment is considered as the two person zero-sum game. In such game, the strategies…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power…
Involution, a phenomenon of excessive competition with diminishing returns, has become a pressing socio-economic concern in contemporary China, prompting both academic inquiry and policy interventions. This paper proposes an evolutionary…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
This paper studies a special kind of equilibrium termed as "balanced equilibrium" which arises in the power allocation game defined in \cite{allocation}. In equilibrium, each country in antagonism has to use all of its own power to…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…
Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
We introduce and analyze a variation of the Bertrand game in which the revenue is shared between two players. This game models situations in which one economic agent can provide goods/services to consumers either directly or through an…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…