Related papers: Towards a model of the human society: A theoretica…
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
Models of cooperation grounded on social networks and on the ability of individuals to choose actions and partners aim to describe human social behavior. Extensive computer simulations of these models give important insight in the social…
In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
In real-world scenarios, individuals often cooperate for mutual benefit. However, differences in wealth can lead to varying outcomes for similar actions. In complex social networks, individuals' choices are also influenced by their…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…
We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoner's Dilemma players are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane. Our…
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible…
Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…
We propose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which an individual $i$ is more (less) likely to imitate a neighbor $j$'s strategy if $j$'s strategy is majority (minority) in $i$'s neighborhood. The results on the evolutionary…
This study examines the application of adversarial attack concepts to control the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in complex networks. Specifically, it proposes a simple adversarial attack method that drives players'…
The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention on the…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens…
We present a game-theoretic model for the spread of deviant behavior in online social networks. We utilize a two-strategy framework wherein each player's behavior is classified as normal or deviant and evolves according to the…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or…
Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…