Related papers: Implementation without commitment in moral hazard …
In this paper, we describe an integrated framework for autonomous decision making in a dynamic and interactive environment. We model the interactions between the ego agent and its operating environment as a two-player dynamic game, and…
A non-equilibrium, generally time-dependent, environment whose form is deduced by optimal learning control is shown to provide a means for incoherent manipulation of quantum systems. Incoherent control by the environment (ICE) can serve to…
This paper considers the problem of autonomous multi-agent cooperative target search in an unknown environment using a decentralized framework under a no-communication scenario. The targets are considered as static targets and the agents…
Implementation theory has made significant advances in characterizing which social choice functions can be implemented in Nash equilibrium, but these results typically assume sophisticated strategic reasoning by agents. However, evidence…
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…
Aggregated phenomena in social sciences and economics are highly dependent on the way individuals interact. To help understanding the interplay between socio-economic activities and underlying social networks, this paper studies a…
The partial alignment and conflict of autonomous agents lead to mixed-motive scenarios in many real-world applications. However, agents may fail to cooperate in practice even when cooperation yields a better outcome. One well known reason…
We study a time-inconsistent singular control problem originating from irreversible reinsurance decisions with non-exponential discount. A novel definition of equilibrium for time-inconsistent singular control problems is introduced. For…
Systems are typically made from simple components regardless of their complexity. While the function of each part is easily understood, higher order functions are emergent properties and are notoriously difficult to explain. In networked…
We provide a theoretical framework to understand how widely used measures of choice difficulty relate. In a binary-option Bayesian expected-utility framework, we show that three measures of difficulty, (i) understanding (ex-ante value),…
Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a…
The impression of free will is the feeling according to which our choices are neither imposed from our inside nor from outside. It is the sense we are the ultimate cause of our acts. In direct opposition with the universal determinism, the…
Classical correlations without predefined causal order arise from processes where parties manipulate random variables, and where the order of these interactions is not predefined. No assumption on the causal order of the parties is made,…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
A commonly used approach to study stability in a complex system is by analyzing the Jacobian matrix at an equilibrium point of a dynamical system. The equilibrium point is stable if all eigenvalues have negative real parts. Here, by…
We consider continuous-time consensus systems whose interactions satisfy a form or reciprocity that is not instantaneous, but happens over time. We show that these systems have certain desirable properties: They always converge…
Promises, impositions, proposals, predictions, and suggestions are categorized as voluntary co-operational methods. The class of voluntary co-operational methods is included in the class of so-called directionals. Directionals are…
In consequential domains, it is often impossible to compel individuals to take treatment, so that optimal policy rules are merely suggestions in the presence of human non-adherence to treatment recommendations. We study personalized…