Related papers: Implementation without commitment in moral hazard …
An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…
We develop a model-independent framework to study the dynamics of decision-making in opinion networks for an arbitrary number of agents and an arbitrary number of options. Model-independence means that the analysis is not performed on a…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to $n$ potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a known function of all $n$ private…
Equilibrium-independent dissipativity (EID) is a recently introduced system property which requires a system to be dissipative with respect to any forced equilibrium configuration. This paper is a detailed examination of EID with quadratic…
The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap. The paper…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
We evaluate the relaxation time to equilibrium, and especially show that it is almost independent from the system size for macroscopic isolated quantum systems. It at most polynomially depends on the system size. This estimation holds when…
A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…
We obtain partial identification of direct and spillover effects in settings with strategic interaction and discrete treatments, outcome and independent instruments. We consider a framework with two decision-makers who play pure-strategy…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
Possibilistic conditional independence is investigated: we propose a definition of this notion similar to the one used in probability theory. The links between independence and non-interactivity are investigated, and properties of these…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic…
Taking symmetric extensions can be considered as a generalisation of forcing, which produces a richer multiverse of models with and without the axiom of choice. We can study the structure of this multiverse using modal logic. In particular,…
Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an $n-1$ size coalition cannot do better by deviating from the…
In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…
We propose a method, based on empirical game theory, for a robot operating as part of a team to choose its role within the team without explicitly communicating with team members, by leveraging its knowledge about the team structure. To do…
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…