Related papers: Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Conve…
Voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference orders have been recently proposed, like majority judgement, range voting or approval voting. Traditionally, probabilistic analysis of voting rules supposes the use of…
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) have recently become popular among many AI researchers because they serve as a natural model for planning under uncertainty. Value iteration is a well-known algorithm for finding…
We consider a distributed multi-agent network system where the goal is to minimize a sum of convex objective functions of the agents subject to a common convex constraint set. Each agent maintains an iterate sequence and communicates the…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group…
Transitive proxy voting (or "liquid democracy") is a novel form of collective decision making, often framed as an attractive hybrid of direct and representative democracy. Although the ideas behind liquid democracy have garnered widespread…
We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…
We design a recursive measure of voting power based on partial as well as full voting efficacy. Classical measures, by contrast, incorporate solely full efficacy. We motivate our design by representing voting games using a division lattice…
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While…
When humans and autonomous systems operate together as what we refer to as a hybrid team, we of course wish to ensure the team operates successfully and effectively. We refer to team members as agents. In our proposed framework, we address…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
Achieving consensus via nearest neighbor rules is an important prerequisite for multi-agent networks to accomplish collective tasks. A common assumption in consensus setup is that each agent interacts with all its neighbors. This paper…
We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over both static and time-varying communication networks, where only local communications are allowed. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific possibly…
In collective systems, the available agents are a limited resource that must be allocated among tasks to maximize collective performance. Computing the optimal allocation of several agents to numerous tasks through a brute-force approach…