Related papers: Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment C…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that…
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as the only rule that avoids justified envy under standard direct…
We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…
Real-Time Bidding is nowadays one of the most promising systems in the online advertising ecosystem. In the presented study, the performance of RTB campaigns is improved by optimising the parameters of the users' profiles and the…
Brand advertising plays a critical role in building long-term consumer awareness and loyalty, making it a key objective for advertisers across digital platforms. Although real-time bidding has been extensively studied, there is limited…
In the setting where participants are asked multiple similar possibly subjective multi-choice questions (e.g. Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), a series of peer prediction mechanisms are designed to incentivize…
Recent work shows that we can use partial verification instead of money to implement truthful mechanisms. In this paper we develop tools to answer the following question. Given an allocation rule that can be made truthful with payments,…
We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…
The next frontier of online advertising is revenue generation from LLM-generated content. We consider a setting where advertisers aim to influence the responses of an LLM to align with their interests, while platforms seek to maximize…
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic…
We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For example, when allocating indivisible goods, no truthful and…
Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
Motivated by practical constraints in online advertising, we investigate single-parameter auction design for bidders with constraints on their Return On Investment (ROI) -- a targeted minimum ratio between the obtained value and the…
We present a unified framework for designing deterministic monotone polynomial time approximation schemes (PTAS's) for a wide class of scheduling problems on uniformly related machines. This class includes (among others) minimizing the…