Related papers: General method for the security analysis in a quan…
We present and demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses to obtain a high key generation rate. The key is obtained by a simple time-of-arrival measurement on the…
Motivated by the question of the distinguishability of ensembles described by the same compressed density operator, we propose a model for one-way quantum secure direct communication using finite ensembles of shared EPR pairs per bit and a…
In this paper, we investigate properties of some multi-particle entangled states and, from the properties applying the secret sharing present a new type of quantum key distribution protocols as generalization of quantum key distribution…
Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An…
We consider the problem of detecting whether an attacker measures the amount of traffic sent over a communication channel-possibly without extracting information about the transmitted data. A basic approach for designing a quantum protocol…
We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostr\UNICODE{0xf6}m-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop…
The security of quantum key distribution relies on the validity of quantum mechanics as a description of nature and on the non-existence of leaky degrees of freedom in the practical implementations. We experimentally demonstrate how, in…
Security against simple eavesdropping attacks is demonstrated for a recently proposed quantum key distribution protocol which uses the Fibonacci recursion relation to enable high-capacity key generation with entangled photon pairs. No…
A new approach to quantum cryptography to be called KCQ, keyed communication in quantum noise, is developed on the basis of quantum detection and communication theory for classical information transmission. By the use of a shared secret key…
As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We…
A communication protocol based on a Gaussian modulation of squeezed states in a single quadrature and measured via homodyne detection can completely eliminate information leakage to an eavesdropper in a pure-loss channel. However, the…
A novel private communication framework is proposed where privacy is induced by transmitting over a channel instances of linear inverse problems that are identifiable to the legitimate receiver but unidentifiable to an eavesdropper. The gap…
Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) makes the quantum signals more distinguishable thus provides additional information about the quantum signal to an eavesdropper. The explicit eavesdropping strategies aimed…
We present a protocol for quantum cryptography in which the data obtained for mismatched bases are used in full for the purpose of quantum state tomography. Eavesdropping on the quantum channel is seriously impeded by requiring that the…
Quantum privacy amplification is a central task in quantum cryptography. Given shared randomness, which is initially correlated with a quantum system held by an eavesdropper, the goal is to extract uniform randomness which is decoupled from…
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has attracted a lot of attention, which exploits deep-rooted quantum physical principles to guarantee unconditional security of communication in the face of eavesdropping. We first briefly review…
We address the question of quantifying eavesdropper's information gain in an individual attack on systems of quantum key distribution. It is connected with the concept of conclusive eavesdropping introduced by Brandt. Using the BB84…
The proposed eavesdropping scheme reveals that the quantum communication protocol recently presented by Bostrom and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] is not secure as far as quantum channel losses are taken into account.
In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.
Quantum key distribution algorithms are considered secure because they leverage quantum phenomena to provide security. As such, eavesdroppers can be detected by analyzing the error rate in the shared key obtained by the parties performing…