Related papers: Popular Matchings -- structure and cheating strate…
In this paper, we give a simple characterization of a set of popular matchings defined by preference lists with ties. By employing our characterization, we propose a polynomial time algorithm for finding a minimum cost popular matching.
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We consider the problem of matching applicants to posts where applicants have preferences over posts. Thus the input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U P,E), where A denotes a set of applicants, P is a set of posts, and there are…
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people, with each person having a preference list that ranks a subset of $A$ as his/her acceptable partners in order of preference, we consider the Roommates Problem (RP) and the Marriage Problem (MP) of matching…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side corresponds to applicants who have preferences and the other side to houses who do not have preferences. We consider two different types of this market: one, where the applicants…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if…
The input of the popular roommates problem consists of a graph $G = (V, E)$ and for each vertex $v\in V$, strict preferences over the neighbors of $v$. Matching $M$ is more popular than $M'$ if the number of vertices preferring $M$ to $M'$…
The gossip problem, in which information (known as secrets) must be shared among a certain number of agents using the minimum number of calls, is of interest in the conception of communication networks and protocols. We extend the gossip…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
In this paper, the problem of matching pairs of correlated random graphs with multi-valued edge attributes is considered. Graph matching problems of this nature arise in several settings of practical interest including social network…