Related papers: Can Selfish Groups be Self-Enforcing?

In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…

The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…

We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…

Coordination and cooperation between humans and autonomous agents in cooperative games raises interesting questions of human decision making and behaviour changes. Here we report our findings from a group formation game in a small-world…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…

This paper studies the formation of the grand coalition of a cooperative game by investigating its possible internal dynamics. Each coalition is capable of forcing all players to reconsider the current state of the game when it does not…

Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

This article studies the user behavior in non-atomic congestion games. We consider non-atomic congestion games with continuous and non-decreasing functions and investigate the limit of the price of anarchy when the total user volume…

We introduce and study a group formation game in which individuals/agents, driven by self-interest, team up in disjoint groups so as to be in groups of high collective strength. This strength could be group identity, reputation, or…

We introduce a model, based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, for studying the dynamics of group formation. The latter constitutes a relevant phenomenon observed in different animal species, whose individuals tend to cluster together forming…

Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…

Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic multi-player multi-armed bandits gained a lot of interest recently. In this class of problems, several players simultaneously pull arms and encounter a collision - with 0 reward - if some of them…

We propose a model of network formation based on reinforcement learning, which can be seen as a generalization as the one proposed by Skyrms for signaling games. On a discrete graph, whose vertices represent individuals, at any time step…

We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…

A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups; each community member has an underlying preference over the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are interested in finding a stable community structure: one where no…

Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interactions. Players engage in public goods games and are…