Related papers: An inventory model for group-buying auction

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue…

In this paper, we propose an inventory model where items are inspected through multiple screening processes before delivery to customers. Each screening process has independent screening rate and defective percentage. Defective items…

This paper deals with the market-bidding problem of a cluster of price-responsive consumers of electricity. We develop an inverse optimization scheme that, recast as a bilevel programming problem, uses price-consumption data to estimate the…

The call auction is a widely used trading mechanism, especially during the opening and closing periods of financial markets. In this paper, we study a standard call auction problem where orders are submitted according to Poisson processes,…

Lost sales inventory models with large lead times, which arise in many practical settings, are notoriously difficult to optimize due to the curse of dimensionality. In this paper we show that when lead times are large, a very simple…

We consider Assemble-to-Order (ATO) inventory systems with a general Bill of Materials and general deterministic lead times. Unsatisfied demands are always backlogged. We apply a four-step asymptotic framework to develop inventory policies…

We introduce a novel strategy to address the issue of demand estimation in single-item single-period stochastic inventory optimisation problems. Our strategy analytically combines confidence interval analysis and inventory optimisation. We…

Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…

Assortment optimization concerns the problem of selling items with fixed prices to a buyer who will purchase at most one. Typically, retailers select a subset of items, corresponding to an "assortment" of brands to carry, and make each…

Auctions are widely used in exchanges to match buy and sell requests. Once the buyers and sellers place their requests, the exchange determines how these requests are to be matched. The two most popular objectives used while determining the…

This paper investigates a two-echelon inventory system with a central warehouse and N (N > 2) retailers managed by a centralized information-sharing mechanism. In particular, the paper mathematically models an easy-to-implement inventory…

This paper develops a theory of competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods based entirely on economic conditions on demand. The key idea is to analyze complementarity and substitutability between bundles of goods, rather than merely…

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in…

Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms…

We consider a manufacturing plant that purchases raw materials for product assembly and then sells the final products to customers. There are M types of raw materials and K types of products, and each product uses a certain subset of raw…

We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that…

We are concerned with optimal control strategies subject to uncertain demands. An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process describes the uncertain demand. The transport within the supply system is modeled by the linear advection equation. We consider…

We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…

We develop the equilibrium equations for the a model generalizing the continuous review (r, q) lost-sales model with constant lead time, multiple outstanding orders and unit Poisson demand. Demand rate is allowed to depend on inventory…