Related papers: Truthful Mechanism Design for Multidimensional Cov…
Coverage path planning is a fundamental challenge in robotics, with diverse applications in aerial surveillance, manufacturing, cleaning, inspection, agriculture, and more. The main objective is to devise a trajectory for an agent that…
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, $(1-1/e)$-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity…
In this work, we provide the first practical evaluation of the structural rounding framework for approximation algorithms. Structural rounding works by first editing to a well-structured class, efficiently solving the edited instance, and…
This paper presents a fast and simple new 2-approximation algorithm for minimum weighted vertex cover. The unweighted version of this algorithm is equivalent to a well-known greedy maximal independent set algorithm. We prove that this…
Finding a minimum vertex cover in a network is a fundamental NP-complete graph problem. One way to deal with its computational hardness, is to trade the qualitative performance of an algorithm (allowing non-optimal outputs) for an improved…
We present algorithms for the Max-Cover and Max-Unique-Cover problems in the data stream model. The input to both problems are $m$ subsets of a universe of size $n$ and a value $k\in [m]$. In Max-Cover, the problem is to find a collection…
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
We study approximation algorithms for the following geometric version of the maximum coverage problem: Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a set of $n$ weighted points in the plane. Let $D$ represent a planar object, such as a rectangle, or a disk. We…
We investigate approximation algorithms for several fundamental optimization problems on geometric packing. The geometric objects considered are very generic, namely $d$-dimensional convex fat objects. Our main contribution is a versatile…
We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money, which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC). An instance of TIC consists of a set of agents each associated with an individual interval on a line, and the…
This paper studies randomized approximation algorithm for a variant of the set cover problem called minimum submodular cost partial multi-cover (SCPMC), in which each element $e$ has a covering requirement $r_e$ and a profit $p_e$, and the…
We introduce the batched set cover problem, which is a generalization of the online set cover problem. In this problem, the elements of the ground set that need to be covered arrive in batches. Our main technical contribution is a tight…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items $M = [m]$ for sale to $n$ bidders, where each bidder $i$ has a private monotone valuation $v_i : 2^M \to R_+$. Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
Mixed packing and covering problems are problems that can be formulated as linear programs using only non-negative coefficients. Examples include multicommodity network flow, the Held-Karp lower bound on TSP, fractional relaxations of set…
Minimum sum vertex cover of an $n$-vertex graph $G$ is a bijection $\phi : V(G) \to [n]$ that minimizes the cost $\sum_{\{u,v\} \in E(G)} \min \{\phi(u), \phi(v) \}$. Finding a minimum sum vertex cover of a graph (the MSVC problem) is…
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…