Related papers: Mining Determinism in Human Strategic Behavior

Despite major advances in quantitative approaches to natural resource management, there has been resistance to using these tools in the actual practice of managing ecological populations. Given a managed system and a set of assumptions,…

Imitation is fundamental in the understanding of social system dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all…

From a self-centered perspective, it can be assumed that people only hold opinions that can benefit them. If opinions have no intrinsic value, and acquire their value when held by the majority of individuals in a discussion group, then we…

We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology. The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices. The agents' objective is to ensure their individual survival over time or,…

Probabilistic game structures combine both nondeterminism and stochasticity, where players repeatedly take actions simultaneously to move to the next state of the concurrent game. Probabilistic alternating simulation is an important tool to…

Detection rules have traditionally been designed for rational agents that minimize the Bayes risk (average decision cost). With the advent of crowd-sensing systems, there is a need to redesign binary hypothesis testing rules for behavioral…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

The present communication addresses a set of observations, obeying both deterministic as well as statistical formal requirements, and serving to operate within the framework of the dynamical systems theory, with a certain emphasis placed on…

We investigate a multi-agent decision-making problem where a large population of agents is responsible for carrying out a set of assigned tasks. The amount of jobs in each task varies over time governed by a dynamical system model. Each…

Large language models are increasingly used in strategic decision-making settings, yet evidence shows that, like humans, they often deviate from full rationality. In this study, we compare LLMs and humans using experimental paradigms…

We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…

Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on…

Decoding strategies play a pivotal role in text generation for modern language models, yet a puzzling gap divides theory and practice. Surprisingly, strategies that should intuitively be optimal, such as Maximum a Posteriori (MAP), often…

The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We consider the problem of estimating preferences of human agents from data of strategic systems where the agents repeatedly interact. Recently, it was demonstrated that a new estimation method called "quantal regret" produces more accurate…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…

This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…

Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…