Related papers: Brandt's Fully Private Auction Protocol Revisited
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…
Secure E-voting is a challenging protocol. Several approaches based on homomorphic crypto systems, mix-nets blind signatures are proposed in the literature .But most of them need complicated homomorphic encryption which involves complicated…
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This…
We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual state of nature, and it can send signals to bidders so as to…
We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal,…
Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency exchanges (shielded AMMs, batched swap auctions, sealed-bid order-flow auctions) alter what the pricing mechanism observes about order flow. We derive the unique linear Kyle equilibrium when a committed…
We propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison of integers when both integers are shared between two parties. Such protocols are useful for implementing secure auctions. The proposed protocol's computational complexity is roughly…
This paper proposes a privacy protocol for distributed average consensus algorithms on bounded real-valued inputs that guarantees statistical privacy of honest agents' inputs against colluding (passive adversarial) agents, if the set of…
E-commerce, a type of trading that occurs at a high frequency on the Internet, requires guaranteeing the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages through long distance. As current e-commerce schemes are vulnerable to…
This study presents the first semi-quantum private comparison protocol under an almost-dishonest third party. The proposed protocol allows two classical participants to compare their secret information without compromising it's privacy. The…
In this work, we study how to securely evaluate the value of trading data without requiring a trusted third party. We focus on the important machine learning task of classification. This leads us to propose a provably secure four-round…
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
A smart grid is an advanced method for supplying electricity to the consumers alleviating the limitations of the existing system. It causes frequent meter reading transmission from the end-user to the supplier. This frequent data…
Collective Investment Algorithms (CoinAlgs) are increasingly popular systems that deploy shared trading strategies for investor communities. Their goal is to democratize sophisticated -- often AI-based -- investing tools. We identify and…
I establish nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. When the number of potential bidders is fixed and…
We propose a new three-party quantum private comparison protocol using genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states. In our protocol, three participants can determine whether their private information are equal or not without an external…
We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market…
A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in…
Recently, Chou et al. [Electron Commer Res, DOI 10.1007/s10660-014-9143-6] presented a novel controlled quantum secure direct communication protocol which can be used for online shopping. The authors claimed that their protocol was immune…