Related papers: Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punish…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
We introduce a general approach based on \emph{selective verification} and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a…
Settings such as lending and policing can be modeled by a centralized agent allocating a resource (loans or police officers) amongst several groups, in order to maximize some objective (loans given that are repaid or criminals that are…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…
We study the computational complexity of finding fair allocations of indivisible goods in the setting where a social network on the agents is given. Notions of fairness in this context are "localized", that is, agents are only concerned…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…