Related papers: Deterministic Team Problems with Signaling Incenti…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
In this paper, we identify sufficient conditions under which static teams and a class of sequential dynamic teams admit team-optimal solutions. We first investigate the existence of optimal solutions in static teams where the observations…
In this paper we define a new model of limited communication for multiplayer team games of imperfect information. We prove that the Team DFA Game and Team Formula Game, which have bounded state, remain undecidable when players have a rate…
In this paper, we consider distributed decision-making over stochastic communication links in multi-agent systems. We show how to extend the current literature on potential games with binary log-linear learning (which mainly focuses on…
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…
We study stochastic two-player turn-based games in which the objective of one player is to ensure several infinite-horizon total reward objectives, while the other player attempts to spoil at least one of the objectives. The games have…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
We study two-stage stochastic optimization problems with random recourse, where the adaptive decisions are multiplied with the uncertain parameters in both the objective function and the constraints. To mitigate the computational…
Multi-agent decision problems are typically solved via distributed iterative algorithms, where the agents only communicate between themselves on a peer-to-peer network. Each agent usually maintains a copy of each decision variable, while…
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…
This paper is concerned with a kind of linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem of backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) with partial information. The cost functional includes cross terms between the state and control, and…
We consider the optimization of an uncertain objective over continuous and multi-dimensional decision spaces in problems in which we are only provided with observational data. We propose a novel algorithmic framework that is tractable,…
One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic differential game. The…
Many real-world games contain parameters which can affect payoffs, action spaces, and information states. For fixed values of the parameters, the game can be solved using standard algorithms. However, in many settings agents must act…
A new approach to linear programming duality is proposed which relies on quadratic penalization, so that the relation between solutions to the penalized primal and dual problems becomes affine. This yields a new proof of Levin's duality…
This paper provides an algorithmic framework for obtaining fast distributed algorithms for a highly-dynamic setting, in which *arbitrarily many* edge changes may occur in each round. Our algorithm significantly improves upon prior work in…
We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling) in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing competitions, open science challenges and…
Linear-quadratic Gaussian games provide a framework for modeling strategic interactions in multi-agent systems, where agents must estimate system states from noisy observations while also making decisions to optimize a quadratic cost.…
This paper investigates an indefinite linear-quadratic partially observed mean-field game with common noise, incorporating both state-average and control-average effects. In our model, each agent's state is observed through both individual…