Related papers: Dynkin Games and Israeli Options
We obtain a verification theorem for solving a Dynkin game driven by a L\'evy process. The result requires finding two averaging functions that, composed respectively with the supremum and the infimum of the process, summed, and taked the…
We introduce a setup of model uncertainty in discrete time. In this setup we derive dual expressions for the super--replication prices of game options with upper semicontinuous payoffs. We show that the super--replication price is equal to…
We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…
In this paper we consider Dynkin's games with payoffs which are functions of an underlying process. Assuming extended weak convergence of underlying processes $\{S^{(n)}\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ to a limit process $S$ we prove convergence Dynkin's…
The properties of value functions of time inhomogeneous optimal stopping problem and zero-sum game (Dynkin game) are studied through time dependent Dirichlet form. Under the absolute continuity condition on the transition function of the…
We show that prices and shortfall risks of game (Israeli) barrier options in a sequence of binomial approximations of the Black--Scholes (BS) market converge to the corresponding quantities for similar game barrier options in the BS market…
A Dynkin game is considered for stochastic differential equations with random coefficients. We first apply Qiu and Tang's maximum principle for backward stochastic partial differential equations to generalize Krylov estimate for the…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
The paper solves constrained Dynkin games with risk-sensitive criteria, where two players are allowed to stop at two independent Poisson random intervention times, via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. This…
We propose an implementable, neural network-based structure preserving probabilistic numerical approximation for a generalized obstacle problem describing the value of a zero-sum differential game of optimal stopping with asymmetric…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
We analyze a two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of stopping with incomplete information. We assume that each player observes his own Brownian motion, which is not only independent of the other player's Brownian motion but also not…
We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of…
We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.
On a filtered probability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P,\mathbb{F}=(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t=0,\dotso,T})$, we consider stopper-stopper games $\overline V:=\inf_{\Rho\in\bT^{ii}}\sup_{\tau\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ and $\underline…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…
We obtain error estimates for strong approximations of a diffusion with a diffusion matrix $\sigma$ and a drift b by the discrete time process defined recursively X_N((n+1)/N) = X_N(n/N)+N^{1/2}\sigma(X_N(n/N))\xi(n+1)+N^{-1}b(XN(n/N));…
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
In optimal stopping problems, a Markov structure guarantees Markovian optimal stopping times (first exit times). Surprisingly, there is no analogous result for Markovian stopping games once randomization is required. This paper addresses…
In this paper, we study a game with positive or plus infinite expectation and determine the optimal proportion of investment for maximizing the limit expectation of growth rate per attempt. With this objective, we introduce a new pricing…