Related papers: Coordination in Network Security Games: a Monotone…
We study the role of imitation within a model of economics with adaptive agents. The basic ingredients are those of the Minority Game. We add the possibility of local information exchange and imitation of the neighbour's strategy. Imitators…
Designing robust reinforcement learning (RL) agents in the presence of imperfect reward signals remains a core challenge. In practice, agents are often trained with proxy rewards that only approximate the true objective, leaving them…
Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…
Humans possess innate collaborative capacities. However, effective teamwork often remains challenging. This study delves into the feasibility of collaboration within teams of rational, self-interested agents who engage in teamwork without…
The resource allocation problem consists of the optimal distribution of a budget between agents in a group. We consider such a problem in the context of open systems, where agents can be replaced at some time instances. These replacements…
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they…
Network coordination games are widely used to model collaboration among interconnected agents, with applications across diverse domains including economics, robotics, and cyber-security. We consider networks of bounded-rational agents who…
Understanding the emergence of cooperation in systems of computational agents is crucial for the development of effective cooperative AI. Interaction among individuals in real-world settings are often sparse and occur within a broad…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…
We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…
We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly…
We study a cost sharing problem derived from bug bounty programs, where agents gain utility by the amount of time they get to enjoy the cost shared information. Once the information is provided to an agent, it cannot be retracted. The goal,…
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…
Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…
We focus on how individual behavior that complies with social norms interferes with performance-based incentive mechanisms in organizations with multiple distributed decision-making agents. We model social norms to emerge from interactions…