Related papers: Coordination in Network Security Games: a Monotone…

We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and…

A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been…

Modern distributed communication networks like the Internet and censorship-resistant networks (also a part of the Internet) are characterized by nodes (users) interconnected with one another via communication links. In this regard, the…

Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

This paper considers the security investment problem over a network in which the resource owners aim to allocate their constrained security resources to heterogeneous targets strategically. Investing in each target makes it less vulnerable,…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general, to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Our goal in…

Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…

We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…

We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…

We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…

The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…

We study the influence of degree correlations or network mixing in interdependent security. We model the interdependence in security among agents using a dependence graph and employ a population game model to capture the interaction among…

This paper focuses on botnet economics and design of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce information on the attackers business models, with rational economic analysis of these business processes, one can…

Combined prosocial incentives, integrating reward for cooperators and punishment for defectors, are effective tools to promote cooperation among competing agents in population games. Existing research concentrated on how to adjust reward or…

A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the context of…

When investing in cyber security resources, information security managers have to follow effective decision-making strategies. We refer to this as the cyber security investment challenge. In this paper, we consider three possible…

In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract…

Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…