Related papers: Purely competitive evolutionary dynamics for games

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…

We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…

Natural selection and random drift are competing phenomena for explaining the evolution of populations. Combining a highly fit mutant with a population structure that improves the odds that the mutant spreads through the whole population…

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…

Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning…

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…

Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…

We consider a trait-structured population subject to mutation, birth and competition of logistic type, where the number of coexisting types may fluctuate. Applying a limit of rare mutations to this population while keeping the population…

The processes and mechanisms underlying the origin and maintenance of biological diversity have long been of central importance in ecology and evolution. The competitive exclusion principle states that the number of coexisting species is…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

Cyclic dominant systems, like rock-paper-scissors game, are frequently used to explain biodiversity in nature, where mobility, reproduction and intransitive competition are on stage to provide the coexistence of competitors. A significantly…

Game theory deals with strategic interactions among players and evolutionary game dynamics tracks the fate of the players' populations under selection. In this paper, we consider the replicator equation for two-player-two-strategy games…

Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer.…

Species diversity in ecosystems is often accompanied by the self-organisation of the population into fascinating spatio-temporal patterns. Here, we consider a two-dimensional three-species population model and study the spiralling patterns…

We perform individual-based Monte Carlo simulations in a community consisting of two predator species competing for a single prey species, with the purpose of studying biodiversity stabilization in this simple model system. Predators are…

We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in a population of finite size. Individuals in the population are divided into two dynamically evolving groups. The structure of the population is formally described by a Wright-Fisher type…

Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…

In this paper we study collective decision making on a multi-population, represented by a regular network of groups of individuals. Each group consists of a collection of players and every player can choose between two options. A group is…