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Inspired by the recent developments in the field of Spectrum Auctions, we have tried to provide a comprehensive framework for the complete procedure of Spectrum Licensing. We have identified the various issues the Governments need to decide…
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…
Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely-used…
We investigate revenue maximization problems in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We consider the frequency division and spread spectrum methods of dynamic spectrum sharing. In the frequency division method, a primary spectrum user…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
Convergence (virtual) bidding is an important part of two-settlement electric power markets as it can effectively reduce discrepancies between the day-ahead and real-time markets. Consequently, there is extensive research into the bidding…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
The evaluation of fairness models in Machine Learning involves complex challenges, such as defining appropriate metrics, balancing trade-offs between utility and fairness, and there are still gaps in this stage. This work presents a novel…
Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion…
Max Consensus-based Auction (MCA) protocols are an elegant approach to establish conflict-free distributed allocations in a wide range of network utility maximization problems. A set of agents independently bid on a set of items, and…
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSP's advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be…
With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large effort to study seller revenue maximization, following Myerson's seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of view of the buyer in…
Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
The study of mechanisms for multi-sided markets has received an increasingly growing attention from the research community, and is motivated by the numerous examples of such markets on the web and in electronic commerce. Many of these…
Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways,…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private…
Preference elicitation is a major challenge in large combinatorial auctions because the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. Recent work has used machine learning (ML) algorithms to identify a small set of bundles to…