Related papers: On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck R…
We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
Internet and graphs are very much related. The graphical structure of internet has been studied extensively to provide efficient solutions to routing and other problems. But most of these studies assume a central authority which controls…
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…
A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…
A common assumption in the existing network coding literature is that the users are cooperative and non-selfish. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. In this paper, we analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
This work explores the relationship between the set of Wardrop equilibria~(WE) of a routing game, the total demand of that game, and the occurrence of Braess's paradox~(BP). The BP formalizes the counter-intuitive fact that for some…
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…
We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…
The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…
We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…