Related papers: Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games
This paper investigates a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian risk-sensitive graphon mean-field games, involving an asymptotically infinite population of heterogeneous agents distributed across an asymptotically infinite network, where each…
In a graphical game agents play with their neighbors on a graph to achieve an appropriate state of equilibrium. Here relevant problems are characterizing the equilibrium set and discovering efficient algorithms to find such an equilibrium…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…
This paper studies the problem of Nash equilibrium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous mean-field games under communication and computation constraints. A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the non-linear utility…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
Recent advances at the intersection of dense large graph limits and mean field games have begun to enable the scalable analysis of a broad class of dynamical sequential games with large numbers of agents. So far, results have been largely…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…
We analyze a simple variant of the Goldfarb-Idnani (GI) dual active-set method for computing variational generalized Nash equilibria of strongly monotone N-player games with convex quadratic costs and shared affine inequality and equality…