Related papers: Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local-I…

We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…

We consider a model of learning and evolution in games whose action sets are endowed with a partition-based similarity structure intended to capture exogenous similarities between strategies. In this model, revising agents have a higher…

The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

The well-known replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes how population-level behaviors change over time when individuals make decisions using simple imitation learning rules. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics…

We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

In general, finite concurrent two-player reachability games are only determined in a weak sense: the supremum probability to win can be approached via stochastic strategies, but cannot be realized. We introduce a class of concurrent games…

In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…

We study the emergence of locally suboptimal behavior in finitely repeated games. Locally suboptimal behavior refers to players play suboptimally in some rounds of the repeated game (i.e., not maximizing their payoffs in those rounds) while…

Global cooperation often falters despite shared objectives, as misaligned interests and unequal incentives undermine collective efforts, such as those in international climate change collaborations. To tackle this issue, this paper…

Potential game is an emerging notion and framework for studying N-player games, especially with heterogeneous players. In this paper, we build an analytical framework for dynamic potential games. We prove that a game is a dynamic potential…

We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely…

We study convergence rates of random-order best-response dynamics in games on networks with linear best responses and strategic substitutes. Combining formal analysis with numerical simulations we identify phenomena that lead to slow…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…

Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…

We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…