Related papers: On Dynkin games with incomplete information

A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…

We propose an implementable, neural network-based structure preserving probabilistic numerical approximation for a generalized obstacle problem describing the value of a zero-sum differential game of optimal stopping with asymmetric…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…

In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In…

We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the information he has…

We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.

We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…

We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…

We adapt the Stochastic Perron's method in Bayraktar and Sirbu (ArXiv: 1103.0538) to the case of double obstacle problems associated to Dynkin games. We construct, symmetrically, a viscosity sub-solution which dominates the upper value of…

We study pricing and superhedging strategies for game options in an imperfect market with default. We extend the results obtained by Kifer in \cite{Kifer} in the case of a perfect market model to the case of an imperfect market with…

We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…

Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…

We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…