Related papers: Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
Auto-bidding is now widely adopted as an interface between advertisers and internet advertising as it allows advertisers to specify high-level goals, such as maximizing value subject to a value-per-spend constraint. Prior research has…
Auctions are widely used in exchanges to match buy and sell requests. Once the buyers and sellers place their requests, the exchange determines how these requests are to be matched. The two most popular objectives used while determining the…
We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…
In the present work we introduce a novel multi-agent model with the aim to reproduce the dynamics of a double auction market at microscopic time scale through a faithful simulation of the matching mechanics in the limit order book. The…
Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…
In this article, we propose a new form of DAO governance that uses a sequential auction mechanism to overcome entrenched control issues that have emerged for DAOs by creating a regime of temporary contestable control. The mechanism avoids…
Peer-to-peer energy trading offers a promising solution for enhancing renewable energy utilization and economic benefits within interconnected microgrids. However, existing real-time P2P markets face two key challenges: high computational…
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…
The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings.…
Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…
We consider a scenario where a seller possesses a dataset $D$ and trains it into models of varying accuracies for sale in the market. Due to the reproducibility of data, the dataset can be reused to train models with different accuracies,…
Many real-world auctions are dynamic processes, in which bidders interact and report information over multiple rounds with the auctioneer. The sequential decision making aspect paired with imperfect information renders analyzing the…
We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…
We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…
We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…