Related papers: Cyclic game dynamics driven by iterated reasoning
The class of weakly acyclic games, which includes potential games and dominance-solvable games, captures many practical application domains. In a weakly acyclic game, from any starting state, there is a sequence of better-response moves…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…
Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
We investigate the fluctuations induced by irrationality in simple games with a large number of competing players. We show that Nash equilibria in such games are ``weakly'' stable: irrationality propagates and amplifies through players'…
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…
Modern economies evolved from simpler human exchanges into very convoluted systems. Today, a multitude of aspects can be regulated, tampered with, or left to chance; these are economic {\em degrees of freedom} which together shape the flow…
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during…
Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
The formation mechanisms and cyclical conditions of collective action have become open issues in research involving public choice, social movements, and more. For this reason, on the basis of rational decision-making and social…
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…
We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
The formation of out-of-equilibrium patterns is a characteristic feature of spatially-extended, biodiverse, ecological systems. Intriguing examples are provided by cyclic competition of species, as metaphorically described by the…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…