Related papers: A Shared-Constraint Approach to Multi-leader Multi…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…

Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…

Motivated by the complex dynamics of cooperative and competitive interactions within networked agent systems, multi-cluster games provide a framework for modeling the interconnected goals of self-interested clusters of agents. For this…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…

In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.…

Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…

In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…

This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

This paper investigates leader-follower linear-quadratic stochastic graphon games, which consist of a single leader and a continuum of followers. The state equations of the followers interact through graphon coupling terms, with their…

In this paper, we explore aggregative games over networks of multi-integrator agents with coupled constraints. To reach the general Nash equilibrium of an aggregative game, a distributed strategy-updating rule is proposed by a combination…

This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…

In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…