Related papers: A Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games

We introduce a new solution concept, called periodicity, for selecting optimal strategies in strategic form games. This periodicity solution concept yields new insight into non-trivial games. In mixed strategy strategic form games, periodic…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…

The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval…

Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational…

This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games, covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

Two-player zero-sum games are a well-established model for synthesising controllers that optimise some performance criterion. In such games one player represents the controller, while the other describes the (adversarial) environment, and…

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems,…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…

Symmetric strategy improvement is an algorithm introduced by Schewe et al. (ICALP 2015) that can be used to solve two-player games on directed graphs such as parity games and mean payoff games. In contrast to the usual well-known strategy…

Our paper addresses characterizing conditions for a linear quadratic (LQ) game to be a potential game. The desired properties of potential games in finite action settings, such as convergence of learning dynamics to Nash equilibria, and the…

Much progress has been made in misere game theory using the technique of restricted misere play, where games can be considered equivalent inside a restricted set of games without being equal in general. This paper provides a survey of…

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…

Adversarial training is a standard technique for training adversarially robust models. In this paper, we study adversarial training as an alternating best-response strategy in a 2-player zero-sum game. We prove that even in a simple…

Potential game is an emerging notion and framework for studying N-player games, especially with heterogeneous players. In this paper, we build an analytical framework for dynamic potential games. We prove that a game is a dynamic potential…

We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…

We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an…