Related papers: A Sampling-Based Approach to Computing Equilibria …

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

This paper designs a distributed stochastic annealing algorithm for non-convex cooperative aggregative games, whose agents' cost functions not only depend on agents' own decision variables but also rely on the sum of agents' decision…

We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…

Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…

This paper investigates stochastic generalized dynamic games with coupling chance constraints, where agents have incomplete information about uncertainties satisfying a concentration of measure property. This problem, in general, is…

Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

A solution concept that is a refinement of Nash equilibria selects for each finite game a nonempty collection of closed and connected subsets of Nash equilibria as solutions. We impose three axioms for such solution concepts. The axiom of…

Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is primarily focused on learning the equilibria of simulation-based games. Recent approaches have tackled this problem by learning a uniform approximation of the game's utilities, and then applying…

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…

Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced…

Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…

For complex nonlinear systems, it is challenging to design algorithms that are fast, scalable, and give an accurate approximation of the stability region. This paper proposes a sampling-based approach to address these challenges. By…

In this work, we present a novel characterization of approximate Nash equilibria in a class of convex games over the simplex. To achieve this, we regularize the utility functions using the Shannon entropy term, connect the solutions to the…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…

Correlated Equilibrium (CE) is a well-established solution concept that captures coordination among agents and enjoys good algorithmic properties. In real-world multi-agent systems, in addition to being in an equilibrium, agents' policies…