Related papers: Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information
A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently and identically distributed. Each bidder may observe an…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The…
We study the problem of constructing a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that achieves omniscience, in a rate-optimal manner, among a set of users that are interested in a common file but each has only partial knowledge about it as…
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender's objective…
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…
Starting from the Avellaneda-Stoikov framework, we consider a market maker who wants to optimally set bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders she receives depend not only on…
The explosive growth of data has highlighted its critical role in driving economic growth through data marketplaces, which enable extensive data sharing and access to high-quality datasets. To support effective trading, signaling mechanisms…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy…
There is an increased sensitivity by people about how companies collect information about them, and how this information is packaged, used and sold. This perceived lack of control is highlighted by the helplessness of users of various…
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…
Information that is of relevance for decision-making is often distributed, and held by self-interested agents. Decision markets are well-suited mechanisms to elicit such information and aggregate it into conditional forecasts that can be…
Information in the form of data, which can be stored and transferred between users, can be viewed as an intangible commodity, which can be traded in exchange for money. Determining the fair price at which a string of data should be traded…
In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recommendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…