Related papers: An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…
`Twenty questions' is a guessing game played by two players: Bob thinks of an integer between $1$ and $n$, and Alice's goal is to recover it using a minimal number of Yes/No questions. Shannon's entropy has a natural interpretation in this…
Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies…
Entropy serves as a central observable which indicates uncertainty in many chemical, thermodynamical, biological and ecological systems, and the principle of the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) is widely supported in natural science. Recently,…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from…
This work investigates a modified Schelling model within the scope and aims of Social Physics. The main purpose is to see if how the concepts of potential and kinetic energy can be represented within a computational sociological system. A…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
We study the equilibrium distribution of relative strategy scores of agents in the asymmetric phase ($\alpha\equiv P/N\gtrsim 1$) of the basic Minority Game using sign-payoff, with $N$ agents holding two strategies over $P$ histories. We…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We propose an analytically tractable variation of the minority game in which rational agents use probabilistic strategies. In our model, $N$ agents choose between two alternatives repeatedly, and those who are in the minority get a pay-off…
We examine the relation between the size of the id space and the number of rational agents in a network under which equilibrium in distributed algorithms is possible. When the number of agents in the network is not a-priori known, a single…
We consider a game-theoretic model of a market where investors compete for payoffs yielded by several assets. The main result consists in a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a strategy, called relative growth optimal, such that the…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…
We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…