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The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determ ine the social diversity of players engaging in the…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
The evolution of cooperation in networked systems helps to understand the dynamics in social networks, multi-agent systems, and biological species. The self-persistence of individual strategies is common in real-world decision making. The…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has often been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most profitable may be the mixed phase sustaining both the…
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…
We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…
Spontaneous synchronization has long served as a paradigm for behavioral uniformity that can emerge from interactions in complex systems. When the interacting entities are identical and their coupling patterns are also identical, the…
We analyze independent policy-gradient (PG) learning in $N$-player linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic differential games. Each player employs a distributed policy that depends only on its own state and updates the policy independently using…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…
The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention on the…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…