Related papers: Undominated Groves Mechanisms
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
The paper deals with the problem of optimization of a guaranteed (worst case) result for a control system described by an ordinary differential equation. The disturbances as functions of time are subject to functional constraints belonging…
In this work we address two questions concerning Grover's algorithm. In the first we give an answer to the question how to employ Grover's algorithm for actual search over database. We introduce a quantum model of an unordered phone book…
An increasing amount of gas-fired power plants are currently being installed in modern power grids worldwide. This is due to their low cost and the inherent flexibility offered to the electrical network, particularly in the face of…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
In this paper, we consider the problem of minimizing the sum of nonconvex and possibly nonsmooth functions over a connected multi-agent network, where the agents have partial knowledge about the global cost function and can only access the…
We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
Chance-constrained optimization has emerged as a promising framework for managing uncertainties in power systems. This work advances its application to the DC Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) model, developing a novel approach to uncertainty…
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…
We study revenue maximization in a buyer-seller setting where the seller has a single object and the buyer has both a private valuation and a private budget. Private budgets complicate the classic single-product monopoly problem, making…
The classical theory of efficient allocations of an aggregate endowment in a pure-exchange economy has hitherto primarily focused on the Pareto-efficiency of allocations, under the implicit assumption that transfers between agents are…
In this work, we study an optimal control problem for a multi-agent system modeled by an undirected formation graph with nodes describing the kinematics of each agent, given by a left-invariant control system on a Lie group. The agents…
A general nonlinear $1$st-order consensus-based solution for distributed constrained convex optimization is proposed with network resource allocation applications. The solution is used to optimize continuously-differentiable strictly convex…
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
Flocking behavior has attracted considerable attention in multi-agent systems. The structure of flocking has been predominantly studied through the application of artificial potential fields coupled with velocity consensus. These…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…
A flow graph $G=(V,E,s)$ is a directed graph with a distinguished start vertex $s$. The dominator tree $D$ of $G$ is a tree rooted at $s$, such that a vertex $v$ is an ancestor of a vertex $w$ if and only if all paths from $s$ to $w$…
The problem of estimating high-dimensional network models arises naturally in the analysis of many physical, biological and socio-economic systems. Examples include stock price fluctuations in financial markets and gene regulatory networks…