Related papers: Undominated Groves Mechanisms
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…
We combine the power flow model with the proportionally fair optimization criterion to study the control of congestion within a distribution electric grid network. The form of the mathematical optimization problem is a convex second order…
Although the specific structures of electricity markets are diverse around the world, they were all conceived on the premise of predictable, controllable generation with nonnegligible marginal costs. Recent changes, specifically, the…
This paper examines necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms when the domain of valuations is restricted. Our approach is to appropriately define the total valuation function, which is the expected…
Grover's search algorithm provides a quadratic speedup over classical brute-force search in terms of query complexity and is widely used as a versatile subroutine in numerous quantum algorithms, including those for combinatorial problems…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents, the local compromisers, to every…
Transportation network design often involves multiple stakeholders with diverse priorities. We consider a system with a hierarchical multi-agent structure, featuring self-optimized subnetwork operators at the lower level and a central…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
We study the problem of scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Grover's quantum algorithm can find a marked item from an unstructured database faster than any classical algorithm, and hence it has been used for several applications such as cryptanalysis and optimization. When there exist multiple…
Standard decision theory seeks conditions under which a preference relation can be compressed into a single real-valued function. However, when preferences are incomplete or intransitive, a single function fails to capture the agent's…
We investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions in order that a unitary operator can amplify a pre-assigned component relative to a particular basis of a generic vector at the expense of the other components. This leads to a general…
We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of…
Grover's algorithm is a well-known unstructured quantum search algorithm run on quantum computers. It constructs an oracle and calls the oracle O($\sqrt N$) times to locate specific data out of N unsorted data. This represents a quadratic…
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker can be employed at only one firm. While firm utilities over…