Related papers: Voting Power : A Generalised Framework
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
This paper provides a serious attempt towards constructing a switching-algebraic theory for weighted monotone voting systems, whether they are scalar-weighted or vector-weighted. The paper concentrates on the computation of a prominent…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…
We use machine learning to provide a tractable measure of the amount of predictable variation in the data that a theory captures, which we call its "completeness." We apply this measure to three problems: assigning certain equivalents to…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
Many real-world voting systems consist of voters that occur in just two different types. Indeed, each voting system with a {\lq\lq}House{\rq\rq} and a {\lq\lq}Senat{\rq\rq} is of that type. Here we present structural characterizations and…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
The map of elections framework is a methodology for visualizing and analyzing election datasets. So far, the framework was restricted to elections that have equal numbers of candidates, equal numbers of voters, and where all the (ordinal)…
Game theory-based approaches have recently gained traction in a wide range of applications, importantly in power and energy systems. With the onset of cooperation as a new perspective for solving power system problems, as well as the nature…
This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. The idea is to represent the grades of each voter on d candidates as a point in R^d and to define the winner of the vote using the deepest point of the…
Our main contribution is the introduction of the map of elections framework. A map of elections consists of three main elements: (1) a dataset of elections (i.e., collections of ordinal votes over given sets of candidates), (2) a way of…
Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results…
The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…
The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for…
The aim of this paper is to generalize a main theorem concerning weighted mean summability to absolute matrix summability which plays a vital role in summability theory and applications to the other sciences by using quasi-$f$-power…
We present a simple theoretical framework, and corresponding practical procedures, for comparing probabilistic models on real data in a traditional machine learning setting. This framework is based on the theory of proper scoring rules, but…
Perpetual voting was recently introduced as a framework for long-term collective decision making. In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome. To achieve…
The Banzhaf Power Index (BPI) is a method of measuring the power of voters in determining the outcome of a voting game. Some voting games exhibit a hierarchical structure, including the US electoral college and ensemble learning methods; we…
The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval…