Related papers: Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
Concurrent accesses to databases are typically encapsulated in transactions in order to enable isolation from other concurrent computations and resilience to failures. Modern databases provide transactions with various semantics…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
We investigate weighted settings of popular matching problems with matroid constraints. The concept of popularity was originally defined for matchings in bipartite graphs, where vertices have preferences over the incident edges. There are…
Preference analysis is widely applied in various domains such as social choice and e-commerce. A recently proposed framework augments the relational database with a preference relation that represents uncertain preferences in the form of…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
Two actively researched problem settings in matchings under preferences are popular matchings and the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. In this paper, we apply the optimality notion of the first topic to the…
We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…