Related papers: Equilibrium balking strategies for a clearing queu…

We consider a service system with two Poisson arrival queues. A server chooses which queue to serve at each moment. Once a queue is served, all the customers will be served within a fixed amount of time. This model is useful in studying…

We consider an M/M/1 feedback queue in which service attempts may fail, requiring the customer to rejoin the queue. Arriving customers act strategically, deciding whether to join the queue based on a threshold strategy that depends on the…

This paper considers a nonstationary multiserver queuing model with abandonment and balking for inbound call centers. We present a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) model which captures the important characteristics of an inbound call…

Multi-server queueing systems describe situations in which users require service from multiple parallel servers. Examples include check-in lines at airports, waiting rooms in hospitals, queues in contact centers, data buffers in wireless…

Queues that feature multiple entities arriving simultaneously are among the oldest models in queueing theory, and are often referred to as "batch" (or, in some cases, "bulk") arrival queueing systems. In this work we study the affect of…

We investigate the game theoretic equilibrium points of a status updating system with an adversary that jams the updates in the downlink. We consider the system models with and without diversity. The adversary can jam up to $\alpha$…

In this paper, we consider revenue maximization problem for a two server system in the presence of heterogeneous customers. We assume that the customers differ in their cost for unit delay and this is modeled as a continuous random variable…

Our work delves into user behaviour at Electric Vehicle(EV) charging stations during peak times, particularly focusing on how impatience drives balking (not joining queues) and reneging (leaving queues prematurely). We introduce an…

The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this…

When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern,…

Polling systems have been widely studied, however most of these studies focus on polling systems with renewal processes for arrivals and random variables for service times. There is a need driven by practical applications to study polling…

Upon arrival to a ticket queue, a customer is offered a slip of paper with a number on it and is told the number of the customer currently in service. The arriving customer then chooses whether to take the slip or balk, a decision based on…

Melamed's theorem states that for a Jackson queuing network, the equilibrium flow along a link follows Poisson distribution if and only if no customers can travel along the link more than once. Barbour \& Brown~(1996) considered the Poisson…

Consider a distribution of citizens in an urban area in which some services (supermarkets, post offices...) are present. Each citizen, in order to use a service, spends an amount of time which is due both to the travel time to the service…

We consider a load balancing model where a Poisson stream of jobs arrive at a system of many servers whose service time distribution possesses a finite second moment. A small fraction of arrivals pass through the so called power-of-choice…

We consider a single server queueing system with admission control and the possibility to switch dynamically between a low and a high service rate, and examine the benefit of this service rate flexibility. We formulate a discounted Markov…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

In this study, we analyse the global stability of the equilibrium in a departure time choice problem using a game-theoretic approach that deals with atomic users. We first formulate the departure time choice problem as a strategic game in…

This paper revisits the Hotelling model with waiting costs Kohlberg (1983), focusing on two specific settings where pure Nash equilibria do not exist: the asymmetric model with two firms and the symmetric model with three firms. In the…

This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…