Related papers: On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium…

I introduce and study a new notion of Archimedeanity for binary and non-binary choice between options that live in an abstract Banach space, through a very general class of choice models, called sets of desirable option sets. In order to be…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…

This paper presents a praxeological analysis of artificial intelligence and algorithmic governance, challenging assumptions about the capacity of machine systems to sustain economic and epistemic order. Drawing on Misesian a priori…

Considering the sequential clearing of energy and reserves in Europe, enabling inter-area reserve exchange requires optimally allocating inter-area transmission capacities between these two markets. To achieve this, we provide a…

An important goal of empirical demand analysis is choice and welfare prediction on counterfactual budget sets arising from potential policy-interventions. Such predictions are more credible when made without arbitrary…

In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…

How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear…

We propose an opinion model based on agents located at the vertices of a regular lattice. Each agent has an independent opinion (among an arbitrary, but fixed, number of choices) and its own degree of conviction. The latter changes every…

This paper considers the problem of offering a scarce object with a common unobserved quality to strategic agents in a priority queue. Each agent has a private signal over the quality of the object and observes the decisions made by other…

The equilibrium properties of allocation algorithms for networks with a large number of nodes with finite capacity are investigated. Every node is receiving a flow of requests and when a request arrives at a saturated node, i.e. a node…

We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…

We study a class of quasi-variational inequality problems defined over infinite dimensional Banach space and deduce sufficient conditions for ensuring solutions to such problems under the upper semi-continuity and pseudomonotonicity…

Coordination is a desirable feature in multi-agent systems, allowing the execution of tasks that would be impossible by individual agents. We study coordination by a team of strategic agents choosing to undertake one of the multiple tasks.…

We consider the unbalanced allocation of $m$ balls into $n$ bins by a randomized algorithm using the "power of two choices". For each ball, we select a set of bins at random, then place the ball in the fullest bin within the set.…

Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…

Coalition Logic is primarily concerned with what coalitions can achieve, whereas what coalitions cannot achieve -- their \emph{inability} -- has received comparatively little explicit attention. This asymmetry matters in artificial…

We consider manipulations in the context of coalitional games, where a coalition aims to increase the total payoff of its members. An allocation rule is immune to coalitional manipulation if no coalition can benefit from internal…

The war of attrition with two-sided asymmetric information is a foundational model in political economy, yet it generically admits a continuum of perfect Bayesian equilibria. This paper characterizes the sources of equilibrium multiplicity.…

We consider a set of secondary transmitter-receiver pairs in a cognitive radio setting. Based on channel sensing and access performances, we consider the problem of assigning channels orthogonally to secondary users through distributed…