Related papers: On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium…
We define two non-linear operations with random (not necessarily closed) sets in Banach space: the conditional core and the conditional convex hull. While the first is sublinear, the second one is superlinear (in the reverse set inclusion…
In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on average, expect their counterparties to think, etc. We offer…
Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…
We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory (e.g., [Kleinberg and Oren, EC'14] and its follow-ups) the focus was on analyzing the…
We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We provide and axiomatize a representation for preferences over lotteries that generalizes the expected utility model. Since the representation uses different utility functions to evaluate different lotteries, the preferences can be…
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent community is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simulations. The individual decisions are based on different local information…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
General equilibrium, the cornerstone of modern economics and finance, rests on assumptions many markets do not meet. Spectrum auctions, electricity markets, and cap-and-trade programs for resource rights often feature non-convexities in…
Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal)…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
The number and the location of monopoles in Lattice configurations depend on the choice of the gauge, in contrast to the obvious requirement that monopoles, as physical objects, have a gauge-invariant status. It is proved, starting from…
The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…
When the traded energy and reserve products between zones are co-allocated to optimize the infrastructure usage, both deterministic and stochastic flows have to be accounted for on interconnector lines. We focus on allocation models, which…
We consider a model of two-sided matching market where buyers and sellers trade indivisible goods with the feature that each buyer has unit demand and seller has unit supply. The result of the existence of Walrasian equilibrium and lattice…
In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…
This essay has three objectives: (i) to report recent generalizations of Fatou's lemma to multi-functions taking values in a Banach space, and framed in terms of both Bochner and Gelfand integration; (ii) to delineate the importance of…