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Reasoning about agent preferences on a set of alternatives, and the aggregation of such preferences into some social ranking is a fundamental issue in reasoning about uncertainty and multi-agent systems. When the set of agents and the set…
Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantities from forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring rules have been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilistic forecasts.…
Nowadays, most business and social interactions have moved to the internet, highlighting the relevance of creating online trust. One way to obtain a measure of trust is through reputation mechanisms, which record one's past performance and…
We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving…
Rating systems play a vital role in the exponential growth of service-oriented markets. As highly rated online services usually receive substantial revenue in the markets, malicious sellers seek to boost their service evaluation by…
We consider a repeated game where a player self-reports her usage of a service and is charged a payment accordingly by a center. The center observes a partial signal, representing part of the player's true consumption, which is generated…
Humans judge each other's actions, which at least partly functions to detect and deter cheating and to enable helpfulness in an indirect reciprocity fashion. However, most forms of judging do not only concern the action itself, but also the…
We study expert advice under reputational incentives, with sell-side equity research as the lead application. A long-lived analyst receives a continuous private signal about a binary payoff and recommends a risky (Buy) or safe action.…
With the recent advance of micro-blogs and social networks, people can view and post comments on the websites in a very convenient way. However, it is also a big concern that the malicious users keep polluting the cyber environment by…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who chooses what quality to supply and may erase its records at a low…
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an…
We examine whether a company's corporate reputation gained from their CSR activities and a company leader's reputation, one that is unrelated to his or her business acumen, can impact economic action fairness appraisals. We provide…
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among $n$ strategic agents. It is well-known that truthfulness is incompatible with any meaningful fairness notions. We bypass the strong negative result by considering the concept…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
When eliciting forecasts from a group of experts, it is important to reward predictions so that market participants are incentivized to tell the truth. Existing mechanisms partially accomplish this but remain susceptible to groups of…
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
Paid crowdsourcing platforms suffer from low-quality work and unfair rejections, but paradoxically, most workers and requesters have high reputation scores. These inflated scores, which make high-quality work and workers difficult to find,…