Related papers: Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both pure and mixed equilibria. In alignment with Spohn's original definition of dependency…
We study the memory requirements of Nash equilibria in turn-based multiplayer games on possibly infinite graphs with reachability, safety, shortest-path, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives. We present constructions for finite-memory Nash…
We study generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with quadratic costs and individual linear equality constraints. Departing from approaches that require strong monotonicity and/or shared constraints, we reformulate the KKT…
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…
The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all $N\times 2$ ($N$-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it.…
In this brief note, we prove that the existence of Nash equilibria on integer programming games is $\Sigma^p_2$-complete.
Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria ($\alpha$-PNE) in weighted atomic congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree $d$. Previously it was known that $d$-approximate equilibria always exist, while…
Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…
We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…