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Federated knowledge discovery and data mining are challenged to assess the trustworthiness of data originating from autonomous sources while protecting confidentiality and privacy. Truth-finding algorithms help corroborate data from…
Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
Private data query combines mechanism design with privacy protection to produce aggregated statistics from privately-owned data records. The problem arises in a data marketplace where data owners have personalised privacy requirements and…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
Double auctions are widely used in financial markets, such as those for stocks, derivatives, currencies, and commodities, to match demand and supply. Once all buyers and sellers have placed their trade requests, the exchange determines how…
Loyalty programs are promoted by vendors to incentivize loyalty in buyers. Although such programs have become widespread, they have been criticized by business experts and consumer associations: loyalty results in profiling and hence in…
Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency exchanges (shielded AMMs, batched swap auctions, sealed-bid order-flow auctions) alter what the pricing mechanism observes about order flow. We derive the unique linear Kyle equilibrium when a committed…
We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal,…
The need of totally secure online auction has led to the invention of many auction protocols. But as new attacks are developed, auction protocols also require corresponding strengthening. We analyze the auction protocol based on the…
We initiate the study of markets for private data, though the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a theory of privacy as a commodity is missing. In this paper, we…
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…
We reconsider and modify the second secure multi-party quantum addition protocol proposed in our original work. We show that the protocol is an anonymous multi-party quantum addition protocol rather than a secure multi-party quantum…
Privacy-protected microdata are often the desired output of a differentially private algorithm since microdata is familiar and convenient for downstream users. However, there is a statistical price for this kind of convenience. We show that…
When studying safety properties of (formal) protocol models, it is customary to view the scheduler as an adversary: an entity trying to falsify the safety property. We show that in the context of security protocols, and in particular of…
An anonymization technique for databases is proposed that employs Principal Component Analysis. The technique aims at releasing the least possible amount of information, while preserving the utility of the data released in response to…
Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might…
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy…
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…