Related papers: Optimal Coalition Structures in Cooperative Graph …

Coalition formation is a key capability in multi-agent systems. An important problem in coalition formation is coalition structure generation: partitioning agents into coalitions to optimize the social welfare. This is a challenging problem…

Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…

Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we…

In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…

The most important challenge in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is the energy constraint. Numerous solutions have been proposed to alleviate the issue, including clustering. Game theory is an effective decision-making tool that has been…

The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…

Cooperation between rational users in wireless networks is studied using coalitional game theory. Using the rate achieved by a user as its utility, it is shown that the stable coalition structure, i.e., set of coalitions from which users…

Let $G$ be graph with vertex set $V(G)$ and order $n$. A coalition in a graph $G$ consists of two disjoint sets of vertices $V_1$ and $V_2$, neither of which is a dominating set but whose union $V_1 \cup V_2$ is a dominating set. A…

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…

This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…

We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…

We analyze the problem of computing a correlated equilibrium that optimizes some objective (e.g., social welfare). Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this…

While a multi-agent approach based on large language models (LLMs) represents a promising strategy to surpass the capabilities of single models, its success is critically dependent on synergistic team composition. However, forming optimal…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition.…

Combinatorial optimization algorithms for graph problems are usually designed afresh for each new problem with careful attention by an expert to the problem structure. In this work, we develop a new framework to solve any combinatorial…

With the advance of complex large-scale networks, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how selfish and spatially distributed individuals will share network resources without centralized coordinations. In this paper, we…

Given an integer weighted bipartite graph $\{G=(U\sqcup V, E), w:E\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}\}$ we consider the problems of finding all the edges that occur in some minimum weight matching of maximum cardinality and enumerating all the minimum…

We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…