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Under study are some vector optimization problems over the space of Minkowski balls, i.e., symmetric convex compact subsets in Euclidean space. A typical problem requires to achieve the best result in the presence of conflicting goals;…
We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is drawn from an unknown distribution, and formalize an offline…
Let $b$ be a symmetric or alternating bilinear form on a finite-dimensional vector space $V$. When the characteristic of the underlying field is not $2$, we determine the greatest dimension for a linear subspace of nilpotent $b$-symmetric…
A planar point set is in convex position precisely when it has a convex polygonization, that is, a polygonization with maximum interior angle measure at most \pi. We can thus talk about the convexity of a set of points in terms of the…
In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here…
We consider the problem of finding Pareto-optimal allocations of risk among finitely many agents. The associated individual risk measures are law invariant, but with respect to agent-dependent and potentially heterogeneous reference…
We study a general class of Principal-Agent problems in continuous time under hidden action. By formulating the model as a coupled stochastic optimal control problem we are able to find a set of necessary conditions characterizing optimal…
We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior…
Many problems of theoretical and practical interest involve finding an optimum over a family of convex functions. For instance, finding the projection on the convex functions in $H^k(\Omega)$, and optimizing functionals arising from some…
We consider the problem of packing congruent circles with the maximum radius in a unit square as a mathematical optimization problem. Due to the presence of non-overlapping constraints, this problem is a notoriously difficult nonconvex…
We consider a generalization of the hyperplane problem to arbitrary measures in place of volume and to sections of lower dimensions. We prove this generalization for unconditional convex bodies and for duals of bodies with bounded volume…
We prove that, in Minkowski space, if a spacelike, $(n-1)$-convex hypersurface $M$ with constant $\sigma_{n-1}$ curvature has bounded principal curvatures, then $M$ is convex. Moreover, if $M$ is not strictly convex, after an…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
The study of convex functions - in particular, of their optimization (really minimization) is one of the most important fields of applied mathematics. Convexity seems to be one of those incredibly well-chosen hypotheses which is just…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highly non-trivial obstacles to achieving fairness, and a very…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…