Related papers: Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spac…
Beyond accuracy, there are a variety of aspects to the quality of recommender systems, such as diversity, fairness, and robustness. We argue that many of the prevalent problems in recommender systems are partly due to low-dimensionality of…
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional…
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…
We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [2011] regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. valuations over intervals $[c,c+1]$, to an additive buyer. This…
We study the proximity of the optimal value of the m-dimensional knapsack problem to the optimal value of that problem with the additional restriction that only one type of items is allowed to include in the solution. We derive exact and…
When the nonconvex problem is complicated by stochasticity, the sample complexity of stochastic first-order methods may depend linearly on the problem dimension, which is undesirable for large-scale problems. To alleviate this linear…
I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent…
In this article, we discuss the equality of two inner products on a vector space. Particularly, we look at some geometric properties that are given to a vector space by an inner product namely, length and angle, and we ask under what…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…
We show that in delegation problems, a principal benefits from belief misalignment vis-\`a-vis an agent when the latter can flexibly acquire costly information. The agent optimally succumbs to confirmatory learning, leading him to favor the…
We study several problems concerning convex polygons whose vertices lie in a Cartesian product of two sets of $n$ real numbers (for short, \emph{grid}). First, we prove that every such grid contains $\Omega(\log n)$ points in convex…
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods…
The Two-dimensional Bin Packing Problem calls for packing a set of rectangular items into a minimal set of larger rectangular bins. Items must be packed with their edges parallel to the borders of the bins, cannot be rotated and cannot…
I study multidimensional sequential screening. A monopolist contracts with a buyer who privately observes information about the distribution of their eventual valuations for multiple goods. After initial private information is reported and…
Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they may instead delegate this problem to an agent with distinct…
In this paper we are interested in "optimal" universal geometric inequalities involving the area, diameter and inradius of convex bodies. The term "optimal" is to be understood in the following sense: we tackle the issue of…
It is well known that the support of an optimal decomposable entanglement witness is completely entangled. We add two more necessary conditions for the optimality: The orthogonal complement of the support must have a nonzero product vector;…
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players…
This paper studies convex duality in optimal investment and contingent claim valuation in markets where traded assets may be subject to nonlinear trading costs and portfolio constraints. Under fairly general conditions, the dual expressions…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific…