Related papers: Sequential Auctions and Externalities
We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design…
In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but possibly exceeds it) in a smart contract. The deposit is used as…
We study an Arrow-Debreu economy with externalities generated by multiplex networks. Market equilibrium prices reflect both the preferences and scarcity of goods, consumers' network centralities arising from goods' externalities, as well as…
We study the optimal placement of advertisements for interactive platforms like conversational AI assistants. Importantly, conversations add a feature absent in canonical search markets -- time. The evolution of a conversation is…
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…
Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study optimal selling mechanisms for dynamic markets with stochastic supply and demand. In our model, buyers with private valuations and…
We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who…
In recent years, the growing adoption of autobidding has motivated the study of auction design with value-maximizing auto-bidders. It is known that under mild assumptions, uniform bid-scaling is an optimal bidding strategy in truthful…
A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…
Resource allocation is considered for cooperative transmissions in multiple-relay wireless networks. Two auction mechanisms, SNR auctions and power auctions, are proposed to distributively coordinate the allocation of power among multiple…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept…
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…