Related papers: Replicator Dynamics of Co-Evolving Networks
We construct a model of social behaviour through the dynamics of interacting agents. The agents undergo game-theoretic interactions where each agent can decide to lend support to particular other agents or otherwise, and agents are rewarded…
Ecology and evolution are inseparable. Motivated by some recent experiments, we have developed models of evolutionary ecology from the perspective of dynamic networks. In these models, in addition to the intra-node dynamics, which…
According to evolutionary game theory, cooperation in public goods games is eliminated by free-riders, yet in nature, cooperation is ubiquitous. Artificial models resolve this contradiction via the mechanism of network reciprocity. However,…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
We describe a formulation of multi-agents operating within a Cyber-Physical System, resulting in collaborative or adversarial games. We show that the non-determinism inherent in the communication medium between agents and the underlying…
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…
Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…
Distributed adaptive filtering has been considered as an effective approach for data processing and estimation over distributed networks. Most existing distributed adaptive filtering algorithms focus on designing different information…
The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…
People often interact repeatedly: with relatives, through file sharing, in politics, etc. Many such interactions are reciprocal: reacting to the actions of the other. In order to facilitate decisions regarding reciprocal interactions, we…
Coevolution on social models couples the time evolution of the network with the time evolution of the states of the agents. This paper presents a new coevolution dynamic allowing more than one rewiring on the network. We explore how this…
In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but,…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
Exploiting the mathematical curiosity of intransitive dice, we present a simple theoretical model for co-evolution that captures scales ranging from the genome of the individual to the system-wide emergence of species diversity. We study a…
Learning how to adapt to complex and dynamic environments is one of the most important factors that contribute to our intelligence. Endowing artificial agents with this ability is not a simple task, particularly in competitive scenarios. In…
Modeling agent behavior is central to understanding the emergence of complex phenomena in multiagent systems. Prior work in agent modeling has largely been task-specific and driven by hand-engineering domain-specific prior knowledge. We…
In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…
Eco-evolutionary game dynamics which characterizes the mutual interactions and the coupled evolutions of strategies and environments has been of growing interests in very recent years. Since such feedback loops widely exist in a range of…
In this paper, I model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. I derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…