Related papers: A Logic for Strategy Updates

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…

We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

Infinite games with imperfect information are known to be undecidable unless the information flow is severely restricted. One fundamental decidable case occurs when there is a total ordering among players, such that each player has access…

We revisit the crucial issue of natural game equivalences, and semantics of game logics based on these. We present reasons for investigating finer concepts of game equivalence than equality of standard powers, though staying short of modal…

We examine the relationship between Dependence Logic and game logics. A variant of Dynamic Game Logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with Dependence Logic is comparable to the one between…

Whether it be in normal form games, or in fair allocations, or in voter preferences in voting systems, a certain pattern of reasoning is common. From a particular profile, an agent or a group of agents may have an incentive to shift to a…

Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…

In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…

We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…

Dynamic game theory offers a toolbox for formalizing and solving for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies in multi-agent scenarios. However, the optimal configuration of such games remains largely unexplored. While there is…

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…