Related papers: Mechanism Design and Risk Aversion
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\min\{m-k+1,…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
Motivated by the applications of rental services in e-commerce, we consider revenue maximization in online assortment of reusable resources for a stream of arriving consumers with different types. We design competitive online algorithms…
We propose a variance-penalized formulation of Bayesian optimal experimental design for nonlinear models that augments the classical expected utility criterion with a penalty on utility variability, yielding a mean--variance objective that…
Bayesian optimal sensor placement, in its full generality, seeks to maximize the mutual information between uncertain model parameters and the predicted data to be collected from the sensors for the purpose of performing Bayesian inference.…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
This paper studies risk in a stochastic auction which facilitates the integration of renewable generation in electricity markets. We model market participants who are risk averse and reflect their risk aversion through coherent risk…
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We consider the economic problem of optimal consumption and investment with power utility. We study the optimal strategy as the relative risk aversion tends to infinity or to one. The convergence of the optimal consumption is obtained for…
Simulation-based optimal design techniques are a convenient tool for solving a particular class of optimal design problems. The goal is to find the optimal configuration of factor settings with respect to an expected utility criterion. This…
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…