Related papers: A generalization of a classical model in contract …

We consider the problem of the evolution of a code within a structured population of agents. The agents try to maximise their information about their environment by acquiring information from the outputs of other agents in the population. A…

We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…

The structure of social relations is fundamental for the construction of plausible simulation scenarios. It shapes the way actors interact and create their identity within overlapping social contexts. Each actor interacts in multiple…

Present bias, the tendency to weigh costs and benefits incurred in the present too heavily, is one of the most widespread human behavioral biases. It has also been the subject of extensive study in the behavioral economics literature. While…

We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…

Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…

In this paper we introduce a general estimation methodology for learning a model of human perception and control in a sensorimotor control task based upon a finite set of demonstrations. The model's structure consists of i the agent's…

A complex system is made up of many components with many interactions. So the design of systems such as simulation systems, cooperative systems or assistance systems includes a very accurate modelling of interactional and communicational…

When designing or analyzing multi-agent systems, a fundamental problem is responsibility ascription: to specify which agents are responsible for the joint outcome of their behaviors and to which extent. We model strategic multi-agent…

We introduce a new framework to model interactions among agents which seek to trade to minimize their risk with respect to some future outcome. We quantify this risk using the concept of risk measures from finance, and introduce a class of…

In this work we introduce an approach for modeling and analyzing collective behavior of a group of agents using moments. We represent the group of agents via their distribution and derive a method to estimate the dynamics of the moments. We…

A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…

Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…

Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested…

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and…

We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the…

This paper explores the emergence of norms in agents' societies when agents play multiple -even incompatible- roles in their social contexts simultaneously, and have limited interaction ranges. Specifically, this article proposes two…

This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…

We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an…

This paper introduces two ongoing research projects which seek to apply computer modelling techniques in order to simulate human behaviour within organisations. Previous research in other disciplines has suggested that complex social…